World Bank Development Impact Blog • NOVAFRICA Development Economics Job Market Talks Podcast

We conduct a randomized experiment with groundnut producers and cooperatives in Senegal to address barriers to managing food safety and complying with international quality standards. We offer producers a bundled contract combining credit, extension, and a price premium guarantee to encourage use of a new food safety technology. The contract is flexible regarding sales of output: while cooperatives offering the contract seek to aggregate members’ output, farmers can seize higher price opportunities when available. We find that producers randomly offered the contract are significantly more likely to purchase the technology, sell more output via cooperatives, and are more likely to comply with international food safety standards in areas where quality would otherwise be lower due to agro-climatic conditions. Two years after our experiment, the cooperatives scaled a similar contract to all members but without a price premium and with an indirect communications strategy. Demand for the technology fell relative to the experiment, but remained persistently higher among previously-treated farmers.